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Production Licensing on the UK Continental Shelf:
Ministerial Powers and Controls
Greg W. Gordon
INTRODUCTION
This article examines the conditions present in the oil production
licenses granted for work on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf
(UKCS) from the perspective of the powers given to the state in order to
influence or control operational matters—a perspective of particular
importance at the moment. Since Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative
governments of the 1970s and 1980s implemented the progressive phasing
out of direct state participation in the British oil business, the United
Kingdom’s approach has been one of “light-handed” regulation.1 This
model places the state in the largely passive role of a permitting authority
assessing specific proposals brought to it by the licensees of particular
blocks. Assumption of that role does not imply that the state and the
industry have not at times worked collaboratively in the development of
strategy, nor does it mean that the state hasn’t pursued policies or
objectives—for a long time, the state has publicly avowed an interest in
maintaining the UKCS as a productive petroleum province for as long as
possible.2 But the state has not proactively set the agenda for particular
developments or assertively “bossed” the industry by requiring it, for
example, to develop particular areas collaboratively through the use of a
hub strategy. The Wood Review now proposes a change in strategy, with
the government taking a much more hands-on role in the development and
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1. See generally Sean Rush, Access to Infrastructure on the UKCS: The Past,
the Present and a Future, MEMERY CRYSTAL LLP (2012), http://www.meme
rycrystal.com/uploaded/Articles/other%20files/Access%20to%20Infrastructure%20
on%20the%20UKCS%20-%20SR%20-%20Feb%202012.pdf [http://perma.cc
/RS6F-8GCL] (the term is used in relation to the Minister’s regulation of third party
access to infrastructure, but it is apt to describe the Minister’s approach more
generally).
2. See, e.g., PILOT Progressing Partnership Working Group, infra note 34
and accompanying text.
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regulation of the UKCS.3 The intention is to move beyond the individual,
field-specific mindset into one that looks at the UKCS more holistically.
The task of considering what new powers might be required to implement
the Wood Review’s proposal should surely begin with a close
consideration of the powers that are already possessed, but this matter has
hitherto received limited attention.4 This paper intends to address that
omission, providing an overview of UKCS licensing in Part I and then
delving into the specific terms and conditions of UKCS licenses in Part II.
This exploration will show that the government is faced with a different
set of challenges now as compared to those addressed in the early pioneer
days when the current rules were created and that adaptation is imperative
to progress.
I. LICENSING ON THE UKCS
A. The License: Historical Development and Character
The offshore British oil and gas production license is a curious
creature. The offshore licensing system was hastily created by a
government which had little experience with onshore oil and gas activity.5
At times the system exhibits eccentricities that hint at a troubled past, but
some of its oddities are no more than harmless quirks. One example of the
latter is the ineptly named “production license,” which is granted many
years before production will commence and, in addition to production,
governs most exploratory drillings and appraisal activities.6 Other
3. See generally Sir Ian Wood, UKCS Maximising Recovery Review: Final
Report, WOOD REVIEW, (2014), http://www.woodreview.co.uk/documents/UKCS
%20Maximising%20Recovery%20Review%20FINAL%2072pp%20locked.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Call For Views On How To Implement The Wood Review
Recommendations To Maximise Economic Recovery Of The UK Continental
Shelf, DEP’T OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, 20 (November 2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3
71357/20141105_WR_autumn_document-draft_-_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc
/428S-N4UZ]. There the Department noted that the process of considering what
new powers would be required would be carried out “[i] n parallel with . . . a
review of the existing powers.” The Department has not yet published the results
of any review of existing powers, but the proposed new powers have been
published in draft in the Energy Bill 2015-16, available for download from
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-16/energy/documents.html [http://perma
.cc /6694-B9E3].
5. T. Daintith, et al., United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law, paras. 1-105–1-06
(3rd ed. 2010).
6. A non-exclusive exploration license also exists. Holders of such
licenses—who may be oil and gas companies or commercial seismic
contractors—receive the right—along with all other holders of such licenses—to
shoot seismic and conduct other specified exploration activities anywhere within
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peculiarities, such as the legal nature of the license, are more significant.
Clearly, the license is not a lease; it is not drafted as such, and, in any
event, a lease would not be appropriate under these circumstances.
Contrary to the position onshore and within the territorial sea,7 the state
does not purport to own either the Continental Shelf or the oil and gas in
strata beneath it; instead, the state only purports to exercise “sovereign
rights” relative to the oil and gas.8 But if it is easy to see that a license is
not a lease, it is more difficult to determine precisely what it is.9 The
license has both regulatory and contractual aspects,10 but the courts have
not yet been called upon to determine whether it is a true legal chimera—
simultaneously both a regulatory instrument and a contract—or an
essentially regulatory instrument in the form of a contract. This important
matter bears on a variety of issues, including the range of remedies that
may be available in the event of breach.11 One significant consequence
arising from the contractual aspect of the license is that it incorporates the
current Model Clauses at the time of its grant to provide its terms and
conditions.12 This characteristic makes it impossible, in the absence of
mutual agreement or retroactive legislation,13 for the state to alter the terms
the territorial sea or UKCS, subject to a number of conditions, currently stipulated
in the Schedule to The Offshore Exploration (Petroleum, and Gas Storage and
Unloading) (Model Clauses) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/2814). The licensee may
only enter any area that is already subject to a production license with that license–
holder’s consent and may not carry out operations so as to interfere unjustifiably
with navigation or fishing or with the conservation of the living resources of the
sea. This paper will focus upon the production license.
7. This position is also contrary to the position that is taken in relation to the
exploitation of the Continental Shelf in other contexts. A person wishing to
develop an offshore windfarm upon the Continental Shelf must obtain both a
license from the regulator and a lease from the Crown Estate, who—in this
context—seek to exercise what seem to be rights of ownership over the UKCS.
8. United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2.1, Jun. 10,
1964, 7302 U.N.T.S. 499 (the same right conferred upon the state by international
law); See also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 77, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
9. See, e.g., the discussion in Daintith, supra note 5, para 1-323.
10. The form is contractual, insofar as both parties sign it and consideration
passes, but the effect is regulatory insofar as it one-sidedly imposes obligations
on the licensee while conferring a range of powers on the relevant government
Minister.
11. See discussion infra Part. I.C.
12. The principal conditions which the Minister imposes on licensees are to
be found in Model Clauses which section 4(1)(e) of the Petroleum Act 1998
provides shall be prescribed by Regulation incorporated into all petroleum
licenses.
13. Retroactive legislation is rare, but for a striking example see discussion infra
Part I.D; See also Greg Gordon, Petroleum Licensing, in OIL AND GAS LAW:
CURRENT ISSUES AND EMERGING TRENDS 65 (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011).

78

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. IV

of an individual license,14 a factor that has acted as a barrier to across-theboard reform and added considerably to the complexity of the system.15 In
this regard, the UKCS’s upstream licensing regime lacks the flexibility
inherent in some other systems which use a purely administrative licensing
model.16
B. Licensing and Regulation on the UKCS
Before considering the license conditions in detail, it is worth
outlining some of the essential features of the production license and the
broader system of governance of which it forms a part.
In the United Kingdom, licenses are not allocated by means of cash
premium bid, with the highest cash bidder winning the acreage.17 Instead,
when there is competition for the same acreage, the Minister of State for
the Department of Energy and Climate Change (the Minister) will
ordinarily grant the license area to the licensee or group of licensees
proposing to conduct the more onerous work program in the initial term of
the license. Although the license refers to “licensee” in the singular—a
convention that shall be followed in this paper—it is common on the
UKCS, as elsewhere, for the license to be obtained by a group of coventurers. As far as the state is concerned, these co-venturers will be
jointly and severally liable for any breaches of license conditions.18
14. Oil and Gas Petroleum Licensing Guidance, OIL AND GAS AUTHORITY,
https://www.gov.uk/oil-and-gas-petroleum-licensing-guidance#legislative-back
ground [https://perma.cc/5KVH-NL76] (last updated Jan. 28, 2015) (DECC’s
Guidance recognizes that “Model Clauses attached to existing licenses are not affected
by the issue of subsequent sets of Model Clauses, except through specifically
retrospective measures.”).
15. There have been many occasions when changes have been made to the
Model Clauses in order to address a particular problem. In the absence of rarely
seen, and politically difficult primary legislation having retroactive effect, these
changes will take effect only for licenses granted after the Model Clauses have
been changed. This leaves many “historic legacy” licenses continuing to run, often
for years after the issue was identified, in which the problem is not resolved. See
infra part II.A.
16. Retrospective change is possible in, for instance, the Norwegian system,
at least for some types of condition: Daintith, supra note 5, para 1-323.
17. Some particularly promising acreage in the fourth, eighth and ninth
rounds were offered in this way, but the sums raised were disappointing and the
United Kingdom did not preserve with this method. See Oil And Gas: licensing
rounds, OIL & GAS AUTHORITY (Jan. 22, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/oil-and-gaslicensing-rounds [https://perma.cc/9BYY-E9CM], for the table available under
the heading “Past Licensing Rounds.”
18. The Petroleum Licensing (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations
2008, S.I. 2008/225, art. 1, ¶ 2 (U.K.) (“Any obligations which are to be observed
and performed by the Licensee shall at any time at which the Licensee is more
than one person be joint and several obligations.”).
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However, as between themselves, the co-venturers will use the Joint
Operating Agreement (JOA) pertaining to the licensed area as a means of
apportioning their liabilities, generally in accordance with each party’s
percentage interest in the asset.19
The production license is the means by which exclusive rights to
“search and bore for and get”20 petroleum within a certain area is given to
the licensee. As noted, supra, the state claims rights in relation to oil and
gas in its natural condition in strata, and hitherto the license has been
granted by the Minister.21 While formal disputes between the Minister and
licensees have been rare, the license stipulates arbitration as the means of
resolving disputes that do arise, except where they relate to a matter
“determined, decided, directed, approved or consented” by the Minister.
The latter category of disputes—all of which could be characterized as
disagreements about the manner in which the Minister has exercised his
administrative function—may not be arbitrated. However, such matters
would seem to be susceptible to judicial review before the courts.
C. The Licensee’s Duties and Sanctions for Breach
Prior to obtaining a license, the licensee must show to the Minister’s
satisfaction that it has the financial and technical capability to undertake
both the operations in contemplation and any environmental remediation
measures that may be required in the event that such operations go wrong.
A company that fails to carry out work that it has undertaken to conduct
in its initial work program, such as the drilling of exploration wells, will
have its license brought to an end at the initial period, unless the failure
has occurred for good reason. Beyond that result, it would seem that the
19. See Scott Styles, Joint Operating Agreements, in OIL AND GAS LAW:
CURRENT PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS 359 (Greg Gordon, et al. eds., 2d ed.
2011).
20. Petroleum (Production) Act 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 36 (Eng.);
Petroleum Act, 1998, c. 17, § 3(1) (U.K.) (this wording, which appeared in the
Petroleum (Production) Act and was repeated in the Petroleum Act, is mirrored in
the Model Clause entitled “Grant of License”; currently Model Clause 2).
21. The particular department responsible for licensing has changed
repeatedly over the last twenty years or so. At various points, this function has
been exercised by the Department of Energy, the Department of Trade and
Industry, and the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. At
the time of writing (May 2015), some administrative functions are in the process
of being transferred to the Oil and Gas Authority (OGA), a new, industry-funded
regulator established in partial implementation of the reforms recommended in
the Wood Review. As the precise detail of the relationship between the OGA and
DECC has yet to be determined, reference throughout this piece will continue to
be made to the Minister, although it may well be that many of the functions
discussed will shortly come to be undertaken by the OGA.
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licensee will suffer no immediate penalty—the Minister will not have
sought a deposit or performance bond as security against the undertaking
of the work in advance, despite the fact that the state stands to suffer
adverse consequences if the promised works are not timely carried out.22
The contractual aspect of the license would suggest that an action could
conceivably lie in the law of contract in the event of such breach.23
However, it has not been the Minister’s practice to seek damages in such
instances. Beyond revocation of the license for breach, the only “remedy”
which the state asserts is the legal right to discriminate in the future
allocation of petroleum licenses against any applicant who has previously
shown “a lack of efficiency and responsibility” in operations under a prior
license.24 Historically, this consequence has been seen as a powerful
incentive to comply with Ministerial requests and meet license
obligations,25 and it may continue to be an inducement for at least some
industry players. But as the UKCS becomes more mature, the licensees
active within the province increase in number and become more diverse.
It cannot be assumed that all oil companies currently active within the
province will be interested in acquiring new licenses; some may be happy
to produce from existing assets and then exit the UKCS. Some may also
take the view that—with the majors realigning their asset base on the
UKCS and becoming increasingly disinterested in obtaining new assets, at
least within the mature areas of the province—threats by the British
government are not credible; it may be grateful to secure such investment
as it is offered.
Other license breaches raise similar problems. Revoking a license
would appear to be a wholly disproportionate response to, for instance, a
licensee inadvertently neglecting to appoint a fisheries liaison officer for
a short period of time after the person previously holding that role left the

22. A failure to timeously carry out work will have the effect of delaying the
time when potentially useful field data will be provided to the Minister and
deferring, perhaps by years, if the license is revoked and the acreage recycled
through a future licensing round, the point when production—and tax revenue on
the profits thereof—will commence.
23. See Greg Gordon, Oil, Water and Law Don't Mix: Environmental
Liability For Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in the UK: Part 1: Liability In The
Law Of Tort/Delict and Under the Petroleum License, 25 EVTL. L. & MGMT. 3,
10 (2013), for further information.
24. This rule was initially part of domestic law but later confirmed at
European Union level. See Council Directive 94/22, Conditions for Granting and
Using Authorizations for the Prospection, Exploration and Production of
Hydrocarbons, 1994 O.J. (L 164) (EC).
25. See Greg Gordon & John Paterson, Mature Province Initiatives, in OIL
AND GAS LAW: CURRENT PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS 128–29 (Greg
Gordon, et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011).
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licensee’s employment.26 Even if the Minister were minded to pursue such
a matter under contract, he would seem to have no prospect of success, as
he would not be able to demonstrate that he had suffered a loss as a result
of the breach.
According to the government, the absence of a gradated scheme of
sanctions for breaches of license conditions poses a potential problem in
the context of implementation of the Wood Review. The government has
consulted on the possibility of introducing an improvement notice and
financial penalty system to assist the new Oil and Gas Authority in
implementing its strategy to maximize overall economic recovery of oil
and gas from the UKCS. It has also stated its intention to introduce a
graduated sanctions system to that further that end.27
II. LICENSE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Having introduced the framework and setting within which license
conditions operate, the time has come to examine the conditions
themselves. This article primarily focuses on the license conditions that
directly or indirectly provide the Minister with some degree of control or
influence over operations.
A. Term Structure and Relinquishment
The term structure and relinquishment provisions particularly
weakened the first generation of British production licenses. These
licenses, granted in the first four licensing rounds between 1964 and 1972,
pertained to some of the most prospective areas of the UKCS. However,
at the time, only two terms comprised the license: an initial term of six
years and a production period of forty years. The license contained limited
relinquishment provisions and, as we shall see below, little in the way of
other provisions that would allow the government to proactively force the
pace of development. Instead, the state was cast in a more passive role,
restricted to approving or rejecting specific proposals submitted by the oil
companies. This approach was rooted in the belief that the industry’s own
commercial self-interest would lead to timely and efficient exploitation of
assets. As Daintith has observed, “the idea that licensees might make
significant discoveries but then not develop them does not appear to have
26. This obligation is contained in Model Clause 45.
27. Implementing the Wood Review Recommendations, DEP’T OF ENERGY &
C LIMATE C HANGE, 20–23 (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads
/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/414444/Call_for_Evidence_Govt_ResponseFINAL_120315.pdf [https://perma.cc/ADZ9-8GKG]. See Energy Bill, 2015-16,
H.L. Bill [62] cl. 41 (Gr. Brit.).
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occurred to those who first drafted the offshore licensing arrangements.”28
This fact is hardly surprising—such behavior would at first sight seem to
be counter-intuitive. But in fact there are a number of reasons why an oil
company might choose not to develop particular discoveries. Oil
companies need access to oil—not just for development in the here and
now, but for the purposes of forward planning. Not all of a company’s
portfolio of assets can be developed simultaneously, and acreage in a
geopolitically stable state—as the United Kingdom has historically been
perceived to be29—is perhaps more likely to be obtained but not
immediately developed as compared to acreage in less stable provinces,
where the need to press on with production quickly might seem to be more
urgent.
The design of the system of direct state take from oil and gas
operations also rendered the UKCS unusually susceptible to this sort of
behavior. As has already been noted, no cash premium is paid in order to
obtain the license,30 and area rentals are low, particularly in the early years
of the license. State take initially took the form of a royalty and taxation
of the profits of production—both of which, of course, are payable only
when the development enters into the production phase. The UKCS is,
therefore, a relatively cheap province in which to “stockpile” acreage. If
the fiscal system does not effectively discourage such behavior, then the
term structure and relinquishment obligations contained in the license take
on a particular importance.
Between 1972 and 2002, the Government experimented with various
term structures, offering up a variety of two-,31 three-32 and even four-term
28. Terence Daintith, Discretion in the Administration of Offshore Oil and
Gas – A Comparative Study, 4 OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 176, para 4104 (2006).
29. In fiscal terms, it has been particularly unstable, with tax rates changing
frequently, sometimes with no or no adequate consultation with the industry. See,
e.g., Emre Üşenmez, The UKCS Fiscal Regime, in OIL AND GAS LAW: CURRENT
PRACTICE AND EMERGING TRENDS 137 (Greg Gordon et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011).
30. The rationale for this is that demanding cash upfront diverts to the state
money that would otherwise be used for exploration and production activities.
There is logic in this, but if such payments are being made in other jurisdictions,
a company may well be inclined to prioritize the development of the assets that it
has already paid good money for than those that it obtained without up-front
capital investment. That said, the amounts raised when this method was utilized
in the fourth, eighth and ninth rounds were not considered sufficient to justify an
ongoing use of this method.
31. See OIL & GAS AUTHORITY, supra note 17 (for a useful summary of the
position.) The seventh to tenth offshore rounds were offered with a six-year initial
period and 30-year production period.
32. Licenses granted in the fifth and sixth rounds, for instance, had an initial
term of four years, a second term of three years and a production period of 30
years. Petroleum (Production) Regulations 1976, S.I. 1976/1129 (U.K.). There
was no relinquishment requirement until the expiry of the second term, at which
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licenses33 with a number of different acreage surrender provisions.
However, none of these models were entirely satisfactory. In the early
2000s, the joint industry and government organization PILOT Progressing
Partnership Working Group (PILOT PPWG) assessed the state of the
regulatory regime in the UKCS, concluding that lengthy initial and second
terms and lax relinquishment requirements were among the factors
contributing to “an environment where there is too little pressure on
licensees to deliver value from their licenses” and in which “decisions on
marginal or high-risk economic activities, or divestment [could] be
repeatedly deferred.”34 PILOT PPWG’s recommendations35 led to the
introduction, in 2002, of the three-term structure used in standard
production licenses today.36
The current production license commences with a four-year initial
term during which the licensee must complete the work program it
promised to undertake in its application. The activities described in the
work program will vary from license to license, but are essentially
concerned with exploration and appraisal.37 The licensee must also
surrender no less than one half of the licensed area back to the government.
There is no strict obligation upon the licensee to carry out a full and
comprehensive survey and appraisal of its block, but the surrender
requirement is intended as an indirect incentive for the licensee to learn as
much as possible about the block before the end of the initial term—a
point no less than two-thirds of the initially-licensed area had to be surrendered.
Id. Licenses granted in the eleventh and twelfth rounds, by contrast, under the
Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations, 1988 had an initial term of
six years, a second term of 12 years and a production period of 18 years.
Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 1988, S.I. 1988/1213
(U.K.). The licensee was obliged to relinquish one-half of the license at the end
of the initial period; there were no further relinquishment provisions. Id.
33. Licenses granted in the seventeenth round for instance, had an initial term
of three years, a second term of six years, a third term of 15 years and a production
period of 24 years: 1988 Model Clauses, as amended by The Petroleum
(Production) (Seaward Areas)(Amendment) Regulations 1996 (SI 1996/2946)
Reg 8. The amount of acreage that the licensee was required to relinquish varied
depending on the amount of exploration work undertaken; the more wells drilled,
the more acreage could be retained.
34. The Work of the Progressing Partnership Work Group, PILOT PROGRESSING
PARTNERSHIP WORKING GROUP 2002, 7, available at http://webarchive.national
archives.gov.uk/20101227132010/http:/www.pilottaskforce.co.uk/files/workgroup/4
22.doc (Other factors identified were the lack of exploration obligations beyond the
initial license term and low area rentals. See id. at 8).
35. Id. at 9.
36. See OIL & GAS AUTHORITY, supra note 14.
37. Companies may, for instance, make a firm commitment to drill a certain
number of wells, or make the undertaking to drill contingent upon the results of a
specified form of seismic survey.
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company would not wish to retain the “wrong half” of the block as a result
of ignorance as to which part had greater prospective potential.
The second term of the standard production license also lasts for four
years. The primary purpose of this term is to enable the licensee to
formulate a field development and production program, which must be
submitted to the government and approved before the end of the period in
order for the license to continue into its third term. At the end of the second
term, the licensee must relinquish all areas of the license not comprising
the producing part.38 A production period lasting eighteen years will then
follow.
Thus, by the time that eight years have elapsed, the licensee will have
explored and appraised the license area, will have produced a field
development and a production plan, and will have been required to
relinquish the overwhelming majority of the area initially granted under
the license. The holder of a modern production license is therefore placed
under significantly more pressure to explore and commence production
than was the case before the new term structure was introduced in 2002.
However, it should be recognized that many pre-2002 licenses containing
different term structures continue to be valid39—a factor which contributed
to the introduction of the Fallow Areas Initiative, discussed further at
section II.D, below.
B. Variant License Forms: The Promote License and The Frontier License
The standard production license is no longer the only production
license available on the UKCS. Following consultation with industry
experts, two variations on the standard production license were introduced
in the early 2000s: the promote license and the frontier license.
The promote license was introduced to make obtaining licenses easier
for small companies that may possess considerable geo-technical ability
but only limited financial resources and technical capacity, to obtain
licenses.40 These types of companies present the government with both an
opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity lies in unlocking the
knowledge and skills held by the individuals who make them up. Many
such companies are either formed by or employ persons who previously
held senior positions in more established companies; they are aware of
38. I.e. the area to which the field development and production program pertains.
39. See License Data, DEP’T OF ENERGY & CLIMATE CHANGE, https://og.decc
.gov.uk/information/license_reports/offshorebylicense.html [https://perma.cc/P629RUYS] (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). All licenses from P1034 backwards pre-date the
2002 reforms. Around 280 such licenses appear to still be extant, including P1, the
first production license to be granted on the UKCS.
40. See Gordon, supra note 13, for further information.
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plays that were not taken up by their former employer that the have
potential for current or future development.41 The government seeks to
attract such players by offering significant discounts to the usual acreage
rental.42
The challenge lies in facilitating the entry of small companies without
exposing workers, the environment and other industry players to excessive
risk.43 The dangers inherent in permitting such companies to obtain a
license are mitigated by the term structure of the license. The initial term
and its associated work obligation are divided into Parts I and II. Part I
lasts two years, during which time the work obligation will normally be to
carry out desk-based work on existing data. During this time, the licensee
is not required to satisfy the usual technical and financial capability
requirements—a position which can be justified because the licensee is
not, at this stage, carrying out physical operations offshore. The technical
and financial capability requirement does not need to be satisfied until Part
II of the work program is reached. By this time, the promote licensee needs
to either acquire the requisite technical and financial capacity itself or—
what is more often the case in practice—to attract a purchaser, or one or
more co-venturers, possessing that capacity by ensuring that work
undertaken in Part I of the program is sufficiently complete. If, by either
of these routes, the licensee succeeds in demonstrating technical and
financial capability, the license will effectively convert into a standard
production license. If not, the license will fail at the end of Part I of the
initial term.
By comparison, the frontier license was introduced in 2004 and
restructured in 2008. It was initially designed, again in consultation44 with
industry leaders, to facilitate the exploration and development of the area
41. There are many reasons why this might be so. Perhaps the modest scale of
the development meant that it was not an attractive proposition for a major company,
but is viable for a smaller player with smaller overheads and different expectations as
to what constitutes an acceptable rate of return; or perhaps technological advances
make the play technically feasible now when it previously was not.
42. It abates the area rental fee by ninety percent for the first two years of the
license.
43. Workers and the environment could potentially be endangered if
companies lacking technical capacity were to be granted a license, a fact both by
the United Kingdom’s government in the design of the promote license and by the
EU in the provisions relating to capacity contained within the Offshore Safety
Directive: Directive 2013/30, art. 4, 2013 O.J. (L 178) 66 (EU). Other industry
players—whether oil companies or contractors—could face an increased chance
of losses associated with default on the JOA or insolvency events, in the event
that companies with a weaker financial covenant are permitted to enter the
marketplace, although arguably this is an ordinary commercial risk against which
they should take appropriate measures to protect themselves.
44. See Gordon, supra note 13, for further information.
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west of Shetland, which has historically been less attractive to the industry
due to its deeper water, difficult geology, and lack of infrastructure. The
license is based on the rationale that oil companies45 will value the opportunity
to gain exclusive rights to explore relatively large frontier areas, but that they
will need longer than the standard four years in order to conduct such work.
Two forms of frontier license now exist: one features a six-year initial term
followed by a six-year second term and an eighteen-year production period,
while the other has a nine-year initial term but is otherwise identical to the sixyear variant. The latter form is available only for the Atlantic margin area
lying to the west of the Outer Hebrides—an area which has hitherto seen
virtually no investment, and which might be described as the new frontier.46
For both, area rental charges are significantly abated, but only for the first two
years of the license. The quid pro quo for these benefits is a significant
increase in the usual surrender obligation: the licensee must relinquish seveneighths of the initial acreage at the end of the initial period. The frontier license
is therefore granted over a very large area for a reasonably general initial
period, permitting oil companies exclusivity over a large frontier area. These
companies will be encouraged to take on these challenges insofar as they are
allowed to obtain the exclusive right to a very large area, to explore it for a
longer period and to pay a lower rental than would be the case with a
traditional license.
The promote and frontier variants of the production license are generally
regarded as success stories. Since the variant forms’ introduction, over three
hundred promote licenses have been awarded, and although the number of
frontier licenses granted is much lower,47 the acreage granted under these
licenses is large. As a result, much of the area to the west of Shetland is either
currently under license or has been licensed and relinquished at least once.

45. Historically, it is the majors who have shown most interest in the frontier area,
but independents are now also starting to obtain operatorship in such licenses. For
instance, Aberdeen-based independent Parkmead obtained frontier acreage West of
Shetland in West of the Hebrides in the twenty-seventh round. See Mark Williamson,
Significant Gas Find for Parkmead Group, THE HERALD (Sept. 24, 2014),http://www
.heraldscotland.com/business/13181667.Significant_gas_find_for_Parkmead_Group
/ [http://perma.cc/X3PG-JKHX].
46. “Frontier” is in increasingly misleading term to apply to the west of Shetland
area. Although still under-developed relative to the mature North Sea area, the west
of Shetland has now seen significant investment. Even a cursory examination of the
field development map available on DECC’s website discloses that much of the area
is now licensed and that a network is now beginning to accumulate; See UKCS
Offshore Infrastructure, Oil & Gas Authority, https://www.gov.uk/government
/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/431078/UKCS_Offshore_Infrastructu
re.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DZD-ACQJ], for a map of the area. The west of Hebrides
area is highly underdeveloped by comparison.
47. 33, by the present author’s calculations.
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C. Ministerial Power to Extend License Periods
The production licenses granted in the UKCS’s early licensing rounds
did not contain any provision expressly empowering the Secretary of State
to extend such licenses when they reached the end of their term. In
practice, however, the Secretary of State has been prepared to permit such
licenses to continue, so long as the field continues to be productive;48 and,
given the broad discretionary powers conferred upon the Secretary of State
by the Petroleum Acts, it would seem to be competent for him to extend
licenses. Thus far, such extensions have generally been granted on a yearby-year basis by means of the issue of a side-letter to the license. A
provision expressly empowering the Minister to extend the license beyond
the end of the initially stipulated production period was not included in the
Model Clauses until 1988,49 but it has been included without amendment
in all subsequent sets of Model Clauses.50 The Minister is not obliged to
offer the extension on the same terms and conditions as existed prior to the
extension.
The power is essentially in the form of a renegotiation clause. It states
that the Minister “may in his discretion agree with the Licensee” that the
license shall continue in force “for such further period as the Minister and
the Licensee may agree and subject to such modification of the terms and
conditions of this license . . . as the Minister and the Licensee may then
agree is appropriate.”51 Theoretically, this provides the Minister with a
useful window of opportunity in which to alter the terms on which the
license is to be held; something he might do in order to facilitate a change
in policy or to plug any lacunae that may have come to light since the
original license was granted. This approach, however, has not been
adopted by the Minister to date.
It is not just at the end of the license that extra time may be required.
Factors such as over-runs in exploratory drilling operations may mean that
the licensee requires extra time at the end of the initial term in order to
complete the work program, while disagreements between the JOA coventurers as to the optimal means of field development could delay the
preparation of a production plan. Only in 2008 was a provision
incorporated into the then-current Model Clauses expressly permitting an
extension to the initial or second term.52 The provision has been repeated
in all subsequent licensing rounds53 and is markedly different from the one
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See OIL AND GAS AUTHORITY, supra note 14.
Petroleum Regulations 1988, supra note 32, Model cl. 6.
See, e.g., Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, Model cl. 9.
Id.
Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, Model cl.7.
I.e., from the 25th round onwards.
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governing extensions of time at the end of the license’s production period.
It does not extend the overall life of the license, but instead essentially
envisages the licensee shifting time from one license term to another—
borrowing from the second term in order to allow it time to complete the
initial term’s work program, or using up time from the production period
to allow it to finalize the field development and production plan.54 Neither
the duration nor the conditions of the extension are a matter available for
negotiation; the licensee applies for an extension of time and the
application is determined by the Minister in such a manner as he may, in
his discretion, see fit.55 For instance, this provision was used to extend the
deadline for the Field Development Plan in the Fyne field from June 2012
to August 2014 when, due to a proposed increase in costs, the operator
decided not to proceed with its initial development concept of using an
FPSO and sought additional time to work up an alternative program using
a different production method. In that case, however, further application
by the field’s operators was rejected, leading to relinquishment of the
field.56
Thus, while the United Kingdom license contains no force majeure
clause, a licensee who suffers a force majeure-type event that prevents it
from timely carrying out its work program or submitting its field
development plan would be well advised and entitled to make an
application for additional time. 57 Indeed, the Fyne case illustrates that,
although the Minister’s patience is not limitless, Ministerial discretion
might—at least initially—be exercised in the licensee’s favor in
circumstances falling short of what would be required to satisfy some force
majeure provisions.
D. Ministerial Oversight and Powers to Direct the Licensee’s activities
The term structure and relinquishment provisions discussed above
provide the Minister with opportunities to direct and control the licensee
to some extent. The need to satisfy certain criteria before the license may
progress from one term to another—in particular the need to satisfy the
Minister that the work program has been satisfactorily completed and a
satisfactory field development plan produced—provide obvious
checkpoints along the road to the development of a particular field.
54. Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, Model cl.7(6).
55. Id. at Model cl. 7(3) & 7(4).
56. Fyne Area, A NTRIM E NERGY I NC ., http://www.antrimenergy.com
/operations/fyne [http://perma.cc/9EWF-N93A] (last visited Aug. 22, 2015).
57. The Model Clause 7 procedure is only available for licenses granted after
2008, but an appeal to the Minister’s general discretion could potentially be made
where the situation arose in a license granted prior to that date.
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However, limits constrain that which can be achieved by a checkpoint
system. Once the license has passed into the production period, the
licensee is in the final phase; all of the checkpoints have been passed. So
if, in the production period, the licensee—while operating the asset in
accordance with the approved field development and production plan—is
unwilling or unable to take further steps that would allow it make optimal
use of its asset,58 the term structure can do nothing to influence the
licensee’s behavior. In any event, even before the license enters into the
production period, a model relying solely upon multiple terms and
relinquishment would provide a fairly unsophisticated system. There may
be a number of actions, not directly pertaining to the work program or
feeding into the production of an acceptable field development plan, that
the Minister would still wish the licensee to take because they are good in
themselves.
The question then arises: what other provisions vest in the Minister
the power to proactively demand that the licensee undertake certain
operations? Under the licenses granted in the first four licensing rounds,
the answer is “very little.” Those licenses provided—and still provide—
the Minister with the right to regular returns of information, including
statements of “all geological work, including surveys and tests, which has
been carried out and the areas in which and the persons by whom the work
has been carried out”59 and “any petroleum, water, mines or workable
seams of coal or other minerals encountered in the course of the said
operations.”60 This is a valuable provision, but data about operations does
not equate to power to influence them. The Minister also had—and has—
various powers to approve the licensee’s proposals for key operations; the
licensee, for instance, cannot drill a well without Ministerial consent.61
These provisions, too, are valuable, allowing the Minister an opportunity
to exercise control and oversight of specific, planned operations. However,
they cast the Minister in a passive role, awaiting the submission of
documents prior to giving or withholding consent. Model Clause 21,
entitled “Avoidance of Harmful Methods of Working,” imposed upon the
58. Perhaps this unwillingness or inability to make optimal use of the asset is
because there is deadlock in the JOA over whether a particular EOR technique is
justified, or perhaps simply because the license group cannot access sufficient
capital to afford the technique.
59. The 1966 Model Clauses, MC 29(1)(a); the equivalent right is now
contained in the 2008 Model Clauses, MC 30(1)(a). Petroleum Regulations 2008,
supra note 18, Model cl. 30(1)(a).
60. The 1966 Model Clauses, MC 29(1)(d); the equivalent right is now
contained in the 2008 Model Clauses, MC 30(1)(d). Petroleum Regulations 2008,
supra note 18, Model cl. 3(1)(d).
61. The 1966 Model Clauses MC 17; see also Petroleum Regulations 2008,
supra note 18, Model cl.19.
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licensee an obligation to “execute all operations in or in connection with
the licensed area in a proper and workmanlike manner in accordance with
methods and practice customarily used in good oilfield practice.”62 However,
any argument that this provision could be used as the foundation for a
Ministerial right to demand that a licensee undertake particular actions would
be weak. When seen in the context of its broader setting,63 this provision
appears to be directed towards the standard by which such operations
undertaken will be performed—not the strategy dictating which particular
operations will be undertaken and when.
So deficient did the Labour Government of 1975 consider the licenses
to be at preserving the state’s interest in directing operations that it passed
primary legislation that retroactively introduced a new suite of Model
Clauses into all licenses then existing.64 The Model Clauses introduced
provided the Minister with significant rights relative to both exploration
and production, and they have been included in every license granted
since.65
Model Clause 16 pertains to exploration activities. It provides that, not
only is the licensee obliged during the initial term to undertake the
activities in the initial work program stipulated at the point of the license’s
grant, but that the Minister is entitled, at any time before the end of the
license, to demand that the licensee provide it with an “appropriate work
program.”66 An appropriate work program is one that would be prepared
by a licensee seeking to exploit its license rights to the best commercial
advantage, unconstrained by a lack of either competence or resources. The
only limitation envisaged is that the program must be one that the licensee
could reasonably be expected to complete before the end of the license
period.67 This Clause embodies “an important and powerful provision”68
that effectively means that the Minister is entitled to demand that the
62. The 1966 Model Clauses MC 21(1); see also Petroleum Regulations
2008, supra note 18, Model cl. 23(1).
63. The 1966 Model Clauses MC 21 is principally concerned with safety and
preventing the escape of oil; see also Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18,
Model cl. 23.
64. Petroleum and Submarine Pipelines Act 1975, §§ 17−18 (U.K.). This was
a controversial measure, not least of all as the Government provided no
compensation, refusing to accept the argument that a license containing this
somewhat greater level of state control was less commercially valuable than one
giving the licensee a freer hand. Parliamentary debate was heated; see, eg., 891
Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1975) cols. 486 & 503; Standing Committee D, Official
Report, (1974-5), H.C. Vol V, cols. 1106 & 1146−72.
65. In discussing these provisions, reference will be made to the numbering
in the current set of the Model Clauses. See, 2008 Model Clauses.
66. Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, Model cl. 16(2).
67. Id.
68. Gordon, supra note 13, para 4.46.
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licensee carry out fresh exploration activities within the licensed area long
after the initial term of the license. It formed the principal legal
underpinning to the Fallow Blocks Initiative, one of the principal means
by which the Minister sought to bring to an end the industry practice of
accumulating acreage without expeditiously exploring it.69
Production issues are addressed in Model Clauses 17 and 18. Model
Clause 18 provides the Minister with a mechanism to place a limit on the
rate of production from the licensed area. To modern eyes, the focus on
the Minster’s right to limit production seems peculiar; however, the
provision was drafted in the pioneering phase of the industry when
politicians were concerned by the fear that the United Kingdom’s national
interests would not be well served if international oil companies could
produce all of the nation’s oil within a very concentrated timeframe.70
Of greater relevance today is Model Clause 17. This provision forbids
the licensee from producing oil in contravention of an approved field
development and production program without first obtaining written
Ministerial consent. The wording of Model Clause 17 differs markedly
from that of Model Clause 16, in that the rights it confers on the Minister
are more tightly circumscribed. The Minister’s grounds for rejecting the
program are limited to only two possibilities: that the program is contrary
to good oilfield practice, or that the maximum or minimum production
level proposed in the program is not in the national interest. This may have
serious implications for the implementation of the Wood Review’s
recommendations relative to collaborative working.71 Can the regulator
refuse to consent to a field development and production plan, when the
plan is a perfectly sensible means of developing the individual field, but is
not in conformity with the regulator’s desire to see licensees work together
collaboratively to maximize overall recovery from the broader
geographical area of which the field forms part? Is the term good oilfield
practice specifically elastic to accommodate this? This must be doubted.
As has already been noted, the term is directed primarily towards safety
and the prevention of leaks. But assuming it can be extended sufficiently
far to embrace matters such as efficiency, it is drawn at the level of the
individual field. And, if what the licensee proposes is a perfectly sensible
and responsible means of developing its oilfield, it is hard to see how that
could be refused. If the regulator purported to do so, the refusal would
69. See Greg Gordon & John Paterson, Mature Province Initiatives, in OIL AND
GAS LAW: CURRENT ISSUES AND EMERGING TRENDS 111, paras 5.12-.22 (Greg
Gordon et al. eds., 2d ed. 2011), for further discussion of the fallow blocks initiative.
70. See ALEX KEMP, THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS,
VOLUME 1: THE GROWING DOMINANCE OF THE STATE 349, 351–52 (Routledge,
2012).
71. Wood, supra note 3, at 12.
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really be on the basis of what one might term “good and collaborative oil
province practice,” not “good oilfield practice.” Neither is the production level
criterion a secure foundation for such a refusal. There may be nothing at all
wrong with the production level that the licensee proposes; the problem may
be that a different mode of working, such as a hub development, might permit
other licensees to produce more, or at lower cost.
The drafting of Model Clause 17 is also less clearly expressed than
that of Model Clause 16. The language has shades of the passivity already
identified as existing elsewhere in the system. As Daintith notes, “the
drafting of [Model Clause 17] assumes that the licensee, not the Minister,
initiates the development process, and is not well designed to compel
development.”72 This contention carries some force: Model Clause 17(2)
states that it is for the licensee to prepare the program and submit it to the
Minister. However, the Minister enjoys at least some power to direct the
licensee—Model Clause 17(2) also provides that the program must be “in
such form and by such time and in respect of such period during the term
of this license as the Minister may direct.” Although far less clear than the
right conferred in Model Clause 16, this provision gives at least some
grounds for arguing that the Minister is entitled to demand—through the
issue of a direction—the submission of a program.
If that is the case, however, a further issue warrants consideration.
Model Clause 17(3) provides that the Minister may direct the licensee to
prepare different programs relative to different areas of the license, or
alternatively that the program cover a particular period in the license only,
in which case the Minister may issue subsequent directions in relation to
other time periods. But what if the Minister does not do this, and instead
approves a generalized program covering the whole of the production area
for the remaining term of the license, only later coming to realize that the
approved program is deficient? Model Clause 17(3) would seem to suggest
that the Minister would, in those circumstances, be barred from demanding
an updated program. If so, this scenario would seem to seriously curtail
the usefulness of Model Clause 17 as a means of exercising Ministerial
control over production. And, given that Model Clause 17 is a major
element of both the Fallow Discoveries and the Stewardship programs73—
the two principal means by which the Minister presently seeks to improve
productivity on the UKCS—this result must be a cause for concern.

72. Daintith, supra note 28, para 4311.
73. For a further discussion of these initiatives, see Gordon & Paterson supra
note 69, paras 5.23–5.49.
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E. Unitization
As we have already seen, some aspects of the United Kingdom’s
offshore licensing regime have changed markedly over time. One feature
that has remained constant throughout the offshore era is the Minister’s
right to demand the unitization of reservoirs that lie within more than one
licensed area.74
The relevant Model Clause empowers the Minister, at any time when
the license is in force, to serve a notice upon the licensee, demanding that
it cooperate with the licensees of the other parts of the shared oilfield.75
The unitization provision therefore cannot be used as a means of
compelling hub developments or some of the other species of collaborative
work envisaged by the Wood Review involving geographical proximity but
not shared geology.76 But, while a shared field is a necessary condition for
the Minister’s use of the power, it is not on its own a sufficient condition.
Before the Minister can serve a notice demanding production of a unit
development plan, he must also be satisfied that other parts of the “single
geological petroleum structure or petroleum field”77 lie beneath the areas
of other production licenses then in force78 and that the field be developed
by all interested licensees collectively, as a unit as “it is in the national
interest in order to secure the maximum ultimate recovery of [p]etroleum
and in order to avoid unnecessary competitive drilling.”79 All parties
receiving such a notice relative to the same field are obliged to cooperate
in the creation of a unit development scheme that must be submitted for
the approval of the Minister.80 If they fail to submit the plan within the
74. As early as 1917, when the United Kingdom was considering making its
first, abortive, attempt at establishing an onshore licensing system, the dangers of
uncontrolled competitive drilling were brought to the government’s attention by
Lord Cowdray of S. Pearson & Son, who had seen the problems caused by
competitive drilling while involved in the oil business in the United States:
Daintith, supra note 5, para 1−103.
75. In the 2008 Model Clauses, the relevant clause is MC 27. The equivalent
Model Clause in earlier licenses is in essentially the same terms. See e.g. The 1966
Model Clauses, MC 25.
76. Wood, supra note 3, at 12.
77. Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, Model cl.27(1).
78. The Minister is not, however, powerless in the case of a field stretching
beyond the licensee’s acreage into an unlicensed area. If the Minister is concerned
that the field development and production program is going to give rise to wasteful
working practices, he could refuse to grant it on the basis that it is contrary to
good oilfield practice: see the discussion of MC 17, above. There would also be a
possibility of the licensee of the block making an out of rounds application to
obtain the other area into which the field falls. For a discussion of out of round
applications, see Gordon, supra note 13, paras 4.22–4.23.
79. Petroleum Regulations 2008, supra note 18, Model cl.27(1).
80. Id. Model cl. 27(2).
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period stated by the Minister, or if, having done so, the Minister is not
satisfied with the scheme and refuses to accept it, “the Minister may
himself prepare a development scheme which shall be fair and equitable
to all licensees.”81 Any licensee who objects to the Minister’s scheme has
a right to arbitrate.82
Although the Minister’s power to compel unitization has never been
used, its existence has led to a significant number of voluntary unitizations
on the UKCS.83 Given the relatively small size of most new fields within
at least the mature areas of the UKCS, Unitization and Unit Operating
Agreements tend to be somewhat simpler than in many other jurisdictions,
with redetermination rights, for instance, being either tightly
circumscribed or wholly absent.
CONCLUSION
Viewing the matter from the standpoint of a regulator wishing to exert
control over operations,84 consideration of the United Kingdom licensing
regime reveals a very mixed picture. At least for modern licenses, a
relatively sound term and relinquishment structure exists that incentivizes
exploration and—within eight years—requires relinquishment of all parts
of the licensed area not required for the development of the field. Clear
and well-designed powers exist to demand additional exploration
throughout the life of the license and to unitize fields that straddle two or
more blocks. These powers, although rarely exercised, have given a sound
legal foundation for Ministerial requests for action. The ability to extend
licenses—and to seek to negotiate new license terms when so doing—
offers some welcome flexibility and a potential window of opportunity to
have recalcitrant licensees accept any changes to the license conditions
that the Minister may think necessary.
Nevertheless, serious deficiencies also exist. Outside of the particular
context of unitization of shared oilfields, the Minister’s operational powers
are directed solely towards the individual license group. Notwithstanding
licenses that are nearing the end of their lives, change is hard to effect due
to the contractual aspect of the license, the incorporation of the Model
Clauses current at the time of the license’s grant, and the lack of
81. Id. Model cl. 27(4).
82. Id. Model cl.27(5).
83. Warwick English, Unitisation Agreements, in UPSTREAM OIL AND GAS
AGREEMENTS 97, 100 (Martyn R. David ed., 1997).
84. At this stage I express no concluded view on the wisdom of such a
regulatory intention, but would make two observations. I expect to return to this
matter in future research when the implementation of the Wood Review is at a
more advanced stage.
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mechanisms available to alter the conditions of the license. As a result,
many existing licenses do not possess the sound term and relinquishment
structure discussed supra, but instead contain a much looser set of
obligations. This problem is compounded by the fact that Ministerial
controls over production are both more tightly circumscribed than those
over exploration and much less clearly drafted. A clear power to compel
collaborative working between licensees is absent. Refusal of a field
development and production program on the basis of “good oilfield
practice” would seem to be the only lever that the Minister possesses in
that regard, and it must be doubted if the territorial scope of this term can
be stretched beyond the licensee’s own field so as to impose an obligation
to work collaboratively with the licensees of other fields. Moreover, the
field development and production plans for many licensed areas will
already have been approved by the Minister, and it is far from clear that
he may return for a second bite at the cherry. There is some irony in the
fact that, at the moment when the need to maximize economic recovery
becomes ever more clear, the clearest power that the regulator possesses
relative to production is the right to slow it down. And yet that was the
power that seemed most important in the pioneering days of 1975; that is
what the government fought and negotiated with the industry to obtain.
The government is faced with a different set of challenges now.

